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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In a memorable speech to the United Nations General Assembly, Nikita 
Krushehev predicted that communism would bury capitalism. In less emotive and 
more economistic terms, he was saying in effect that centrally planned economies 
would outperform market economies in terms of both output growth and social 
justice. History has not been kind to Krushehev. Not only central planning but even 
milder forms of state interventionism now stand discredited, and developing 
countries round the world are desperately trying to install functioning market 
economics. This sea-change in development philosophy generally owes something to 
donor conditionalities associated with structural adjustment credits, to the extent that 
“reforms” and “structural adjustment” have become virtually synonymous. Short-
term internal or external balance crises, and longer-term stagnation, also signalled to 
policy-makers the bankruptcy of over-interventionist policies—a lesson driven home 
by the phenomenal growth performance of the NIC’s, apparently the fruit of market-
friendly policies.  
In general, reform measures can be classified into three types: expenditure-
reducing, i.e., monetary, fiscal and wage restraints, expenditure—switching or 
supply-side measures intended to shift resources from non-tradable to tradables, e.g. 
real devaluation, tariff and subsidy reduction (aimed at bringing domestic prices in 
line with world prices for tradables), and institutional and policy reforms primarily 
armed at providing the private sector with a congenial environment. The policy 
package appropriate for a century will depend on initial conditions, e.g. demand-side 
policies will be most effective in a country where desired absorption exceeds full 
employment output capacity. And a country whose social and cultural backgrounds 
are conducive to rapid response to expenditure switching will have less need for 
expenditure reduction with its inevitable contractionary consequences. 
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The fundamental problem with reforms lies precisely in this, that demand-side 
policies are contractionary and act rapidly, while supply-side policies, which will 
hopefully stimulate growth, take longer to implement and to show results. Reforms 
therefore tend to lead to a (hopefully short-run) decline in economic activities, with 
the brunt being borne by the poor and possibly other “excluded” groups—women, 
ethnic minorities. The first signs of such a contraction may lead to displays of 
discontent by the affected groups which scare the government of the day into 
aborting the reforms, thus compounding the problem. It is therefore being 
increasingly recognised that reform programmes must have built into them protective 
policies for the poor. It should be kept in mind, however, that those who are must 
vocal against reforms are not usually the real poor—very often they constitute 
“labour aristocracy”, like employees in state-owned enterprises. 
 
II.  THE REFORM-POVERTY LINKAGE 
THEORY AND EVIDENCE 
Reforms may impinge on poverty directly or indirectly, via their effect on 
growth. Other things being equal, reforms that increase the growth rate will alleviate 
poverty. Arguably this is in fact the only sustainable poverty-reduction strategy. The 
direct effect of reforms are however likely to be negative. Trade liberalisation, 
privatisation, and labour market reforms may generate unemployment and lower the 
income of small-holder producing for a (protected) domestic market. Labour market 
rigidities and labour militancy will usually prevent instantaneous reallocation of 
labour.  Also, public expenditure cuts associated with fiscal discipline are likely to 
fall most heavily on social expenditure, which benefit, or at least are expected to 
benefit, the poor. 
After looking  at the available evidence, Cornia, Jolly and Stewart conclude: 
“… in almost 60 percent of [IMF-assisted] countries growth deteriorated or 
did not improve in the first programme year, and real investment levels also 
declined or stagnated between 1980 and 1983 … with falling output and, at 
best, mixed evidence about changes in income distribution … the number 
of people in poverty in many “adjusting countries” increased” (p. 67). 
Evidently, one year is far too short a time period in which to expect reforms to 
show their real effects. 
A World Bank study [Jayarajah et al. (1996)] reports findings much more 
favourable to adjustment policies: 
“… Poverty has declined in 23 of the 33 countries for which two data 
survey points are available and increased in the remaining ten. In the 
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sample of 23 core adjusting countries … poverty has declined in 15 
countries and increased in eight” (p. 72). 
 
III.  REFORMS IN BANGLADESH 
In a sense the reform process started in Bangladesh in 1975, when the new 
regime started dismantling some elements of the command economy which the 
Awami League government had attempted to install. The ceiling on private 
investment in industry  was abolished, denationalisation of public sector enterprises 
began a  secondary foreign exchange market was introduced. In the 1980s, a more 
systematic approach to reform became apparent as they were incorporated as 
conditionalities in credit agreements with the World Bank and the IMF. The eighties 
may be called the decade of reforms. 
The main accomplishments of the reform agenda may be summarised as 
follows: 
1. Fiscal reforms: revenue effort has been significantly improved while 
lowering marginal income and corporation tax rates The Value Added Tax has 
replaced sales taxes, though coverage remains incomplete. On the expenditure side, 
there were significant outbacks in subsidies and economic sector expenditures while 
increasing essential social expenditure, notably on primary education. The overall 
budget deficit, which averaged 9.3 percent of GDP in the period 1980–84, was 
brought down to 5.7 percent in FY96 and an estimated 5.4 percent in FY97 [World 
Bank/ADB (1998) Statistical Appendix]. This has contributed to a low rate of 
inflation, which averaged 13.4 percent annually over the period 1980–84, but came 
down to 1.8 percent in 1994. (There has been some upward pressure since then, and 
currently may be as high as 8 percent). 
2. Monetary policy: The financial sector in Bangladesh was based on four 
Nationalised Commercialised Banks, which had little freedom to act as true 
commercial banks. They were primarily used as vehicles of directed credit, with little 
attention to the economic viability of the activities being financed. Not surprisingly, 
debt default mounted and by the end of the eighties the financial sector was near 
collapse. In 1990 a Five Year Financial Reform Project was initiated, which aimed to 
improve the loan classification system, recapitalise banks suffering from capital 
inadequacy, improve the supervisory and regulatory system, introduce more market-
based interest rate policies, improve loan recovery, and encourage private sector 
initiatives in banking. 
Success has been limited so far, specially in the matter of recovering defaulted 
loans. In the meantime, the tight money policy adopted to discourage further buildup 
of bad debts is penalising legitimate borrowers. 
However, monetary aggregates and interest rates have probably moved in the 
right direction (Table 1). Credit to government is erratic, but credit to “other public 
sector”,  which  includes  notably  the  parastatals,  shows a  downward  trend,  while  
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credit to private sector has been tightened somewhat. Expansion of total liquidity has 
been curbed somewhat, reflecting, hopefully, concern with quality. 
3. Trade and Exchange Rate Policy. Bangladesh has liberalised the foreign 
trade regime to a significant extent, specially in the nineties. Tariff rates have been 
significantly reduced, bringing down both nominal and effective protection rates, as 
shown in Tables 2 and 3 below. 
There has also been significant progress in removing non-tariff barriers, which 
now cover only about 2 percent of tariff lines. This, however, covers the important 
textile sector. 
 
Table 2 
Nominal Protection Rates 
 Agriculture Mining Manufacturing All Tradables 
Pre-reform 
1990-91 
   Unweighted 
   Import-weighted 
   Dispersion (CV) 
 
Post-reform 
1995-96 
   Unweighted 
   Import-weighted 
   Dispersion (CV) 
 
 
90.5 
20.9 
63.3 
 
 
 
26.0 
10.1 
56.7 
 
 
54.1 
24.0 
51.7 
 
 
 
13.6 
18.8 
82.2 
 
 
89.0 
51.8 
58.6 
 
 
 
24.6 
21.9 
73.5 
 
 
88.6 
42.1 
59.0 
 
 
 
24.6 
21.0 
72.7 
Source:  World Bank, Dhaka, October 1996, Table 1. 
 
 
Table 3 
Effective Protection Rates 
 Agriculture Industry Overall SD CV 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
45.71 
37.96 
31.29 
23.50 
119.52 
67.06 
57.25 
49.03 
88.15 
54.7 
46.22 
38.18 
107.73 
45.52 
39.9 
34.16 
122.22 
83.22 
88.33 
89.45 
Source:  As for Table 2, Annex 2. 
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Currently the government seems to have got cold feet about carrying trade 
policy reforms to their logical conclusion, which would be a uniform low tariff rate 
on all imports. 
Bangladesh continues to operate a managed float of its currency. A series of 
mini-devaluations since 1995 have nominally depreciated the Taka by more than 20 
percent. The real effective exchange rate, however, continues to appreciate, 
reflecting stronger devaluations of the currencies of its trading partners. 
4. Industry: the scope for private investment in industry has been gradually 
expanded. This is specially true for export-oriented industries, who enjoy bonded 
warehouse and duty drawback facilities as well as a cash subsidy. Foreign 
investment is being actively wooed with an apparently highly attractive incentive 
package. But poor infrastructure, inefficient bureaucratic support and political 
uncertainty neutralise much of the perceived gains to foreign investors, or for that 
matter to domestic investors. 
The government is in principle committed to privatisation of state-owned 
enterprises, but progress is slow due to labour militancy, and possibly also a residual 
attachment to state enterprises in some quarters. 
5. Agriculture: starting from the late seventies, input markets, in particular 
fertiliser and minor irrigation equipment, have been progressively liberalised. By 
1991, all wholesale and retail trade in fertiliser, including imports, was in private 
hands, though the ex-factory price if urea and TSP continued to be set by 
administrative fiat. From 1988, importers were allowed to import duty-free any 
brand of irrigation engine (instead of brands approved by the Ministry of 
Agriculture). Siting and zoning regulations were also abolished. Irrigated area and 
fertiliser use boomed, and by 1992 Bangladesh was a marginal rice exporter. 
However, the early nineties saw a slump in rice production, with production 
declining in 1994-95 and 1995-96, and recovering to trend level in 1996-97. 
In 1994-95 there was a crisis in the urea market, caused primarily by excessive 
public sector exports in tandem with a rise in demand caused by an abrupt lowering of 
the ex-factory price from Tk. 202 to Tk. 186 per 50 kg, and also by rising rice prices. 
But the government chose to see this as a failure of the market, and reintroduced some 
controls-only licensed dealers could lift from factories or government a godowns, and 
they had to sell within areas specified in their contract with the designated factory. 
 
IV.  INCOME AND POVERTY IN BANGLADESH 
On the whole, therefore, Bangladesh has made considerable progress towards 
implementing economic reforms along the lines recommended by the major bilateral 
donors. One would therefore expect at least a temporary contraction of the economy, 
accompanied by some increase in poverty. 
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In point of fact, in the eight years from 1983-84 to 1990-91, year-to-year GDP 
growth rates (at constant 1984-85) market prices was above 5 percent in only one year 
(1989-90, 6.63 percent), above 4 percent but less than 5 percent in three years, and below 
4 percent in the remaining four. In the seven following years to 1996-97, the growth rates 
were above 4 percent in all but one year (1990-91, 3.4 percent), and above 5 percent in 
1995-96 and 1996-97).1 The former period can perhaps be considered somewhat 
contractionary, but we have seen that most of the major policy reforms were 
implemented only near the end of the eighties. It is worth noting that this is the first time 
in the history of Bangladesh that a four percent or above growth rate has been sustained 
for five successive year, and that too at a time when agriculture was stagnating. 
A study by CIRDAP [CIRDAP (1998)] defines the period 1974–1986 as the 
pre-reform period and 1987–1995 as the reform period. Using a simple regression 
model with a dummy for the reform period, they find that growth rate of GDP was 
3.8 percent in the pre-reform period and 4.1 percent in the reform period. The 
difference was not statistically significant. 
It would seem, therefore, that so far Bangladesh has managed to escape the 
contraction usually associated with the early phases of a reform programme. This 
may be partly due to the fact that some of the really tough measures, like extensive 
privatisation, remain half-done. 
Nor does available evidence suggest any significant increase in poverty—on 
the contrary, there appears to have been a modest improvement (Tables 4 and 5). 
Can these developments be related to the reform measures? The effects of 
certain sectoral reforms are relatively uncontroversial. There is no doubt, for 
example, that liberalisation and privatisation of agricultural input markets, 
particularly irrigation equipment, fuelled unprecedented growth in crop production. 
Liberalisation of cereal imports in 1994 also helped to contain poverty by putting a 
natural cap (the import parity price) on rice prices, which is a major determinant of 
poverty. Fiscal restraint may have helped by keeping overall inflation low. More to 
the point, public expenditure cuts have not been disproportionately on social 
expenditures from which the poor can expect some benefits. The main safety nets, 
Food for Work and Vulnerable Group Development, have also escaped the axe. In 
fact, social sector public expenditure in real terms rose from less than Tk. 8 billion in 
1989-90 to Tk. 28.5 billion in 1995-96 (Table 6). 
But the main reasons for the relative success on the poverty front probably has 
little to do directly with economy-wide reforms. The main credit has to go to micro-
credit programmes of the kind pioneered by the Grameen Bank and subsequently (or 
concurrently) taken up by NGOs and government programmes. It has been estimated 
that the three largest such programmes, Grameen Bank, BRAC (an NGO) and RD-12 
(a government programme), together had 3.5 million loanees, who constituted (assuming 
one member per household) 45 percent of the target household. By 1994 they had 
disbursed US $1.3 billion in loans [Khandkar, Khalily and Khan (1996), p. 9)].  
1World Bank (1998), Table 2. 
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Table 4 
Trend in Poverty in Bangladesh, 1983–95 
Head-Count 
Index (%) 
Poverty-Gap 
Index (%) 
Squared Poverty-Gap 
Index (%) 
 
Source 1a Source 2b Source 1a Source 2b Source 1a Source 2b 
 National 
    1983-84 
    1985-86 
    1988-89 
    1991-92 
    1995-96 
 
52.3 
43.9 
47.8 
49.7 
47.0 
 
58.5 
51.7 
57.1 
58.8 
53.1 
 
14.5 
10.4 
12.5 
13.6 
12.8 
 
16.5 
12.3 
15.4 
17.2 
14.4 
 
5.7 
3.5 
4.6 
5.1 
4.9 
 
6.6 
4.2 
5.8 
6.8 
5.4 
 Urban 
    1983-84 
    1985-86 
    1988-89 
    1991-92 
    1995-96 
 
40.9 
30.8 
35.9 
33.6 
26.3 
 
50.2 
42.9 
43.9 
44.9 
35.0 
 
11.4 
7.3 
8.7 
8.4 
6.0 
 
14.3 
10.9 
11.1 
12.0 
9.2 
 
4.4 
2.5 
2.8 
2.8 
1.9 
 
5.8 
3.8 
3.8 
4.4 
3.4 
 Rural 
    1983-84 
    1985-86 
    1988-89 
    1991-92 
    1995-96 
 
53.8 
45.9 
49.7 
52.9 
51.1 
 
59.6 
53.1 
59.2 
61.2 
56.7 
 
15.0 
10.9 
13.1 
14.6 
14.1 
 
16.8 
12.5 
16.0 
18.1 
15.4 
 
5.9 
3.6 
4.8 
5.6 
5.5 
 
6.7 
4.3 
6.1 
7.2 
5.7 
Source:  Binyak Sen and Atiur Rahman, Fighting Poverty: Emerging Perspectives South Asia Poverty 
Monitor 1998; BIDS, Dhaka, 1998.  
Note:   aEstimated by using CBN method based on per capita expenditure distribution (grouped data). 
Base year non-food poverty line was updated by using non-food CPI; food poverty line is 
estimated by costing the fixed bundle using implied prices calculated from the survey, see, 
Ravallion and Sen (1996) and Sen (1998). 
            bEstimates are based on CBN method using per capita expenditure distribution (unit-record data). 
Food poverty line is estimated by costing the fixed bundle using implied food prices derived from 
the survey. Non-food poverty line for each survey data is estimated by assessing the total amount 
of per capita non-food expenditure incurred by households whose per capita food expenditure 
roughly corresponds to the food poverty line [see, World Bank (1998)]. 
 
Table 5 
Changes in the Incidence of Rural Poverty, 1987 to 1994 
Indicators 1987 1989-90 1994 
Head Count Ratio 
(Percent of Households) 
     Extreme Poor 
     Moderate Poor 
     Extreme and Moderate Poor 
Poverty Gap Ratio (Percent) 
Distributionally Sensitive 
Measure (FGT-index) 
 
 
25.8 
31.7 
57.5 
 
21.7 
10.9 
 
 
30.7 
28.6 
59.3 
 
24.8 
13.5 
 
 
22.5 
29.2 
51.7 
 
19.2 
9.6 
Source: Analysis of Poverty Trends Project, 62 Village Resurvey, 1995. 
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Table 6 
Annual Development Programme: Social Sector Expenditures in Constant Prices 
Spending Category 
Fiscal Year 
1990 
Percentage 
of ADP 
Fiscal Year 
1996 
Percentage 
of ADP 
Fiscal Year 
2001 
(Planned) 
Percentage 
of ADP 
Total  Social Expenditures 
     Education 
     Health 
     Family Planning 
     Social Welfare 
Total ADP 
7.93 
3.15 
1.37 
3.07 
0.36 
71.75 
9.95 
3.96 
1.71 
3.85 
0.45 
100.00 
28.54 
15.88 
5.85 
4.94 
1.87 
117.00 
24.39 
13.57 
5.00 
4.22 
1.60 
100.00 
45.45 
23.88 
13.80 
4.83 
2.98 
154.52 
29.43 
15.45 
8.93 
3.12 
1.93 
100.00 
Source:  World Bank (1998), Table A4.1. 
Note:  Education includes spending for religion in 1996 and 2001. Sports and culture not included. 
 
Another development that has helped hold poverty at bay is the growth of 
non-farm activities in rural and semi-rural areas. These represent growth linkages 
from the “Green Revolution” as well as public expenditure on infrastructure. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Bangladesh appears to have managed to implement a significant part of the 
economic reform agenda without suffering from any drastic ill-effects. However, 
contrary to the French proverb, it may be the final steps that hurt. For the time being, 
poverty alleviation initiatives by NGOs and a social expenditure that is at least 
moderately pro-poor has complemented the reform effort and made the transition to 
a market economy relatively painless. 
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